Volume 24, Issue 10, October 2024, Page 120-121.

"Detours" explores the reception of Kant's works in Vienna, Austria and Eastern Europe from a historical point of view and focuses on six topics: Kant and Censorship, Kant and Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who was the first Kantian born in Vienna and became a precursor for German and Austrian Kant reception in Jena, Kant and Eastern Europe, Kant and his Poets, Kant and Phenomenology and Kant and the Vienna Circle. In this way, the ambivalent perception of Kant in Austria becomes (...) clearer: On the one hand Kant was censored and criticized harshly but on the other hand Kant's philosophy was studied actively in the "underground.". (shrink)

The fundamental aim of this study will be to offer a precise account of the meaning of Hegel's concept of recognition as it is found in the early Jena-Schriften and the Phenomenology of Spirit . However, in locating the origins of the concept in Greek tragedy, we will also be led beyond the meaning of the concept to its significance. Its significance is established most clearly insofar as the concept can be used to form the basis of an overall (...) interpretation of the PhG as resembling a tragedy. The contemporary influence and relevance of the concept is presented in the Introduction. ;Part I traces the emergence of the concept of recognition out of the concept of love in the Frankfurt-Schriften; it then treats the subsequent development of the concept in the early systematic efforts of the Jena era. Part II focuses upon the distinctive and detailed treatment of the concept as it is portrayed in the PhG. Part III locates the origins of Hegel's concept in Greek tragedy, i.e., tragic recognition, and moves on to consider recognition within the structure of the wholes in the PhG and Greek tragedy. ;The concept of recognition has been seen as Hegel's attempt to come to terms with the individual's lack of integration in modern society. It is employed as a critique of social contract theory in the sense that recognition demands more from individuals in a society than the "merely external bonding" of a contract. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, as opposed to the social and interpersonal senses, has not been given sufficient attention. This can be explained somewhat by the fact that this sense is not featured in the early Jena-Schriften. The relation between knowledge and recognition becomes a pressing issue in the PhG. The self-knowledge sense does not supplant the other senses; rather, it supplements them and thus enriches the concept. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, and even the relation between the different senses is best explicated by reference to tragic recognition. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has been thrust into the center of Hegel scholarship in the last fifty years for two main reasons. First, the publication of the Jena manuscripts showed recognition to be a fundamental and pervasive theme in Hegel’s early systematic efforts. It is in fact possible to distinguish and evaluate these works according to the role that recognition plays within them. Second, the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the concept of recognition is introduced, (...) has been often treated as the most crucial part of the PhG. (shrink)

Fichte was at the height of his philosophical activity and influence during the last decade of the eighteenth century in Jena. It was during this period that he developed his idea of a Wissenschaftslehre or a “science of knowledge.” A Wissenschaftslehre is an ongoing investigation by subjects of their subjectivity which may be captured only imperfectly in medias res in the form of a written document, but which is crucially not identical with any written philosophical text. So Fichte distinguishes (...) between Wissenschaftslehre and its presentations. In the Jena period Fichte completed two such presentations. The first, the Grundlage der gesammten Wis-senschaftslehre [WL], contains the famous analysis of the preconditions for consciousness in terms of the posits of I and not-I and their reciprocal limitation. Fichte became dissatisfied with his treatment of the central problems in the 1794 version and began working on a second version in 1796. Only two introductions and the first chapter of this new presentation appeared in print. Due to his dawning belief that philosophy was appropriately done solely in oral or dialogic form and the psychic toll of the “atheism controversy” that led to his dismissal from Jena in 1799, by the early 1800's Fichte abandoned plans to publish the entire second presentation. Lectures on the entire second presentation given in 1796-9, the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo [WLnm], are preserved, however, in two sets of student notes. The importance of the discovery of these notes is difficult to overestimate. WLnm develops new and more convincing positions on such fundamental issues as the nature of subjectivity, the unity of reason, and the relation between self-consciousness and intersubjectivity that greatly enhance Fichte's historical status and his relevance to contemporary debates on a variety of philosophical concerns. (shrink)

This short piece is collected in the complete edition of Fichte's works published by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (1964-2012), IV/1, pp. 153-167. According to the editors' foreword, it first appeared anonymously as part of a pamphlet titled "Something from Professor Fichte and for him. Published by a veracious schoolmaster" in 1799 in Bayreuth as a response to the so-called atheism dispute, which eventually cost Fichte his chair in Jena. This translation concerns a part appended to the pamphlet which (...) is titled "Professor Fichte's Ideas on God and Immortality. Published from lecture notes". The schoolmaster who published the pamphlet was Christian Wilhelm Friedrich Penzenkuffer, who had studied theology and was at that time teaching biblical exegesis at high school. It was found that among the students who attended Fichte's lectures in the winter semester 1794 there was a Johann Friedrich Penzenkuffer, probably a brother of the pamphlet author. It seems most plausible that the content of the pamphlet came from a student transcript of Fichte's lectures on logic and metaphysics in Jena and the anonymous publication was intended as a defence for Fichte that what he taught was not atheism but rather theism. This pamphlet has importance not only as part of its immediate context - the atheism dispute - but also for Fichte's philosophy of religion more generally. (shrink)

Hegel’in Jena döneminde zamanın diyalektiği sorununu yalnızca Tinin Fenomenolojisi’nin “Duyusal Kesinlik” bölümünde ele aldığına yönelik genel anlayış, geçtiğimiz yüzyılda orta Jena dönemi derslerine ait el yazmalarının yayımlanmasıyla yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. 1804-1805 ile 1805-1806 yıllarına ait olan “Jena Sistem taslakları”nda Hegel’in doğanın zamanın üç boyutuna dair kapsamlı bir diyalektik geliştirdiği görülür. Bu çalışmada Christophe Bouton, söz konusu iki sistem taslağında doğanın soyut zamanına ait momentlerin ürettiği sonlu diyalektiğin Hegelci mantıksal ikili sonsuzluk teorisiyle nasıl aşıldığını inceler. Bouton’a göre (...) orta Jena dönemi taslakları sadece Hegel’in düşünsel gelişim sürecine ışık tutmaz, aynı zamanda Hegel’in Berlin döneminde açıkça ortaya koyacağı doğanın zamanı ile Tinin zamanı olarak tarih arasındaki ilişkiyi de temellendirir. Bu bağlamda Heidegger, Koyré ve Bloch gibi yorumcuların aksine Bouton, Hegelci zaman diyalektiğinin kökeninde geçmişin ya da geleceğin önceliği tezini reddeder. Bouton’a göre Hegel felsefesinde zamanın anlamı, zamanın diğer iki boyutundan yalıtılmış olan geçmişte değil, üç zamansal boyutu kendinde içeren somut şimdidedir. Bouton, zaman ve zamana tabi olan hadiselerin yarattığı açmazın yanı sıra, ezeli ve ebedilik ile somut şimdi arasındaki ilişkiyi Jena dönemi ile Berlin dönemine ait dersler ışığında inceler. (shrink)

Hegel, nell’Enciclopedia, definisce la filosofia leibniziana come “la contraddizione” completamente sviluppata. Da sempre questa affermazione ha suscitato l’attenzione degli interpreti e nel tempo si è consolidata l’immagine storiografica di uno Hegel poco attento nei confronti di Leibniz, o semplicemente iniquo nella sua valutazione. Approfondendo tuttavia i termini concettuali del giudizio hegeliano e ripercorrendone insieme la genesi storica e sistematica, la questione appare teoreticamente ancora aperta e stimolante. Il vibrante dialogo che Hegel fin dai primi anni di Jena instaura con (...) Leibniz supera le anguste barriere di un confronto di “filologia storica”, ma si pone piuttosto come un momento assolutamente significativo in rapporto a quel processo di auto-comprensione che il pensiero moderno attua nei propri confronti e che rappresenta uno dei lasciti più preziosi sui quali si è oggi chiamati a riflettere. (shrink)

Comme l’indique le titre, c’est l’idéalisme qui est retenu pour solutionner le problème de l’objectivité, encore que le dogmatisme se présente tout naturellement comme le premier candidat. En effet, la tentation est grande d’expliquer cette nécessité qui accompagne la représentation par une «cause» extérieure, en l’occurrence par l’objet qui affecte. Ce qui signifie toutefois une rechute dans le naturalisme. Il est donc exclu pour Fichte que la représentation de l’objet puisse être issue d’une chose en soi affectant le sujet. Au (...) dogmatisme, Fichte oppose évidemment son idéalisme critique. Contrairement à l’opinion courante cependant, ce choix n’implique pas que Fichte rejette entièrement le concept de «chose en soi». Grâce à une discussion nuancée de la question du statut de la chose en soi chez Fichte, Martin réussit à montrer que l’étiquette de «dogmatisme» désigne en vérité non pas le réalisme, mais bien plutôt la théorie qui cherche à expliquer l’objectivité de la représentation à l’aide d’une affection provenant de la chose en soi. Malgré certaines formulations imprudentes de Fichte, son refus de la chose en soi ne concerne que cette explication de l’affection, si bien que la question du statut de la chose en soi, considérée indépendamment du problème épistémologique de l’objectivité, demeure une question ouverte chez Fichte. Le dogmatisme condamné ici doit donc être soigneusement distingué du réalisme. Cette distinction permet d’ailleurs de maintenir simultanément deux affirmations apparemment divergentes de Fichte: la première, selon laquelle une synthèse de l’idéalisme et du réalisme est possible, et la seconde, d’après laquelle le dogmatisme, comme vis-à-vis de l’idéalisme en regard de l’explication de l’objectivité, est carrément inacceptable. En insistant de la sorte sur la différence sémantique qui prévaut entre dogmatisme et réalisme — c’est-à-dire la doctrine qui admet l’existence d’objets extérieurs sans référence au problème de l’affection — Martin est en mesure de trancher le différend qui oppose Rockmore et Rabb sur cette question. (shrink)

Erhard Weigel (1625-1699), mathematician from Jena, developed within the context of his efforts for a mathematically oriented universal science and for a methodologically exact natural theology also a mathematical proof of God, which should prove God’s existence irrefutably and with the highest degree of certainty. Leibniz, as is known a disciple of Weigel himself, was already acquainted with the proof ’s earliest drafts from the 1670’s on and referred to almost all of Weigel’s publications on the proof of God (...) in his writings, which shows his never ceasing interest on this topic. The article presents the rationale of Weigel’s proof of God as well as the central aspects of Leibniz’s in part assenting while also in part critical considerations to it and gives an outlook on the importance of the topic for Leibniz’s own development. (shrink)

In order to understand the place Max Scheler occupied in the debates of his time around the notion of Europe, this article aims to shed some light on the possible convergences between Max Scheler and Rudolf Eucken, who was his thesis director at Jena. The article begins by outlining Rudolf Eucken's conception of Europe, then it identifies a number of points in common between the two authors, before finally measuring the extent of these convergences in Scheler's conception of Europe. (...) At the end of the discussion, it appears that the reception of Augustinianism and a shared conception of community reveal interesting links between the two authors. This connection will give the twenty-first-century reader a better understanding of the framework in which Max Scheler's reflections on Europe are set. (shrink)

Following the publication of 7 letters from Baer to the Frorieps by H.E. Müller-Dietz inNTM N.S. 1 (1993), 2 further letters from Baer and 8 from the Frorieps are published. A curious technical problem in the presentation of the journalNotizen published by Froriep in his Landes-industriecomptoir in Weimar is discussed at length. Froriep recommends his son Robert, to whom Baer sends several enquiries and commissions, which Robert deals with carefully (1831 in Jena, 1849 in Paris). Robert explains in great (...) detail his intention to leave Jena for Berlin in 1831. After his father's death in 1847 he returns to take charge of the Landesindustriecomptoir and begins to cooperate with the newly founded Russian Geographic Society as publisher on behalf of the Society. But about 1850 the cooperation is discontinued by the Russians, and Froriep, who is in economic difficulties, asks Baer (who lives and works in St. Petersburg) urgently (but in vain) to help him with the Society. (shrink)

“Questioning explanation.” With this method, Doz proposes a “personal” reading of Hegel’s logic. Thus, one should not expect to discover in Doz’ book a close commentary of the Jena Logic or the Encyclopedia Logic, but an explanation dedicated to showing how Hegel’s project is an attempt to complete the history of metaphysics. Hegel’s metaphysics takes the form of a “speculative philosophy” or a “science of logic,” the task of which is to expose the necessary forms of thought. As the (...) science of pure thought or pure science, it is rooted in Aristotelian ontology: Aristotle’s enterprise, later identified as metaphysics, consists in grounding philosophy as a double science: the science of being as being and the science of the unmoved and supersensible essence-substances. Such a double science marks the birth of what Heidegger—to whom Doz acknowledges a “debt”—calls onto-theology. It is Doz’ main claim that the Hegelian logic is the completion of metaphysics as onto-theology. While taking into consideration the specificity of Hegel’s project—viz., to elevate metaphysics to the status of pure thinking, in other words to elevate being to the concept—Doz’ reading is after the “unthought” that governs such a project, an unthought which is precisely to be looked for in Hegel’s metaphysical heritage. Hence the second part of the title, which operates like a guiding thread into the unthought: “The Traditional Problems of Ontology”. (shrink)

This paper will, in its successive steps and movements, revolve around one single question, a question that might, at first sight, come across as somewhat irrelevant or even impertinent within the context of philosophical or academic discourse. How romantic is Jean-Luc Nancy? Or: is there a specifically Nancyan sense of romance? Notwithstanding these somewhat unscholarly formulations, I am increasingly convinced that the question of love, or indeed more specifically of romance, is the most intimate inspiration of Nancy’s work, the key (...) unlocking all other keys. The theme of love has always played an important role in his work, from the early essay “Shattered Love” (“L’amour en éclats,” 1986) to his later works on the body and pleasure. In this paper, I will touch upon a number of these texts, but I will more particularly refer to two of Nancy’s more recent works, the yet untranslated book Sexistence from 2017 and Expectation: Philosophy, Literature (2018, published in French in 2015 as Demande: Littérature et philosophie). The question of romance, that is, the question of passionate interaction, of intrigue, of writing, of dramatization. This quite heterogeneous web of associations already implies a number of age-old philosophical issues: the relation between love and thinking; the relation between love and literature; and, subsequently, between philosophy and literature; the issue of the relation itself. The knot uniting these issues under the single heading of “romance” has been most firmly tied about two centuries ago, in the late eighteenth-century movement of early German, i.e., Jena, Romanticism, that significant moment in intellectual history where the barriers between philosophy and literature were broken down and where, quite generally put, the sense of the world was conceived of as a matter of romanticization. Although Nancy himself would be reluctant to call himself a Romantic philosopher in this historical sense of the word, this is exactly what I want to argue here: I want to show that Nancy’s philosophy of love – and by extension his philosophical thinking tout court – should be placed in the tradition of German Romanticism, rather than in that of, for instance, phenomenology, ontology, or philosophy proper. This claim is massive in its depth and scope and can impossibly be explored here in an exhaustive way. Instead, I will flesh out this perspective by advancing four successive hypotheses that enable to mark the contours of what I call Nancy’s romanticism. With this exploration, I hope to do three things at once: firstly, to underscore what I take to be the core or pulse of Nancy’s thinking: the issue of romance; secondly, to investigate to what extent this romantic pulse might be traced back to the Romantic tradition; and, thirdly, to emphasize why Nancy’s romantic thinking is relevant for us today. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉDans ses écrits de Jena, Fichte tente de résoudre l’apparent conflit entre la nécessité de faire reposer la philosophie sur des principes scientifiques et celle de respecter sa nature de vocation autonome. Ce faisant, il a prétendu accomplir d’autres tâches, sur les plans métaphilosophique, pédagogique et polémique : justifier les questions qui l’occupaient, communiquer sa pensée correctement et répondre aux incompréhensions de ses adversaires. Cet article montre qu’à travers ces considérations, Fichte s’essaie aussi au problème plus vaste qui consiste (...) à préciser la relation entre la «lettre» de la philosophie comme doctrine et son «esprit» intersubjectif. (shrink)

Translator's preface -- Commentator's preface -- Commentator's introduction -- J.G. Fichte : on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Commentary: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Text: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- F.K. Forberg : development of the concept of religion -- Commentary: development of the concept of religion -- Text: development of the concept of religion -- G.: a father's letter to his student son (...) about Fichte's and forberg's atheism -- Commentary: a father's letter to his student son about Fichte's and Forberg's atheism -- Text: a father's letter to his student son abou tFichte's and Gorberg's atheism -- Friedrich August : Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Karl August : Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Saxon requisition letter to the weimar court -- Text: Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte: appeal to the public -- Commentary: appeal to the public -- Text: appeal to the public -- K.l. Reinhold: letter to Fichte -- Commentary:letter to fichte -- Text: letter to Fichte -- J.G. Fichte : juridical defense -- Commentary: juridical defense -- Text: juridical defense -- Ernst I. Ludwig : Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Students of the University of Jena : first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : first reply to the University of Jena and students of the University of Jena : second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : second reply to the University of Jena -- Commentary: first and second petitions to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and first and second replies to the University of Jena -- Text: first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: first reply to the University of Jena -- Text: second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: second reply to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte : from a private letter -- Commentary: from a private letter -- Text: from a private letter -- J.G. Fichte : concluding remark by the editor -- Commentary: concluding remark by the editor -- Text: concluding remark by the editor. (shrink)

In his well-known work of art criticism _Art of the Modern Age_, Jean-Marie Schaeffer offered a lucid and powerful critique of what he identified as the historically dominant thinking about art and aesthetics from the Jena Romantics, to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, and beyond, which he termed “the speculative theory of art.” Here, in _Beyond Speculation, _Schaeffer builds from this significant work, rejecting not only the identification of the aesthetic with the work of art, but also the Kantian association of (...) the aesthetic with subjectively universal judgment. In his analysis of aesthetic relations, he opens up a space for a theory of art that is free of historicism and capable of engaging with noncanonical and non-Western arts. By engaging with the ideas of Arthur Danto, Gérard Genette, Nelson Goodman, George Dickie and Rainer Rochlitz, and evoking a range of aesthetic experience from Proust to King Kong to Japanese temple design, _Beyond Speculation_ makes an original and engaging contribution to the development of the philosophy of culture. “While Schaeffer is not afraid to do the necessary detail work, he never gets mired in issues of merely scholastic interest.”—F. L. Rush, _Bookforum_, on _Art of the Modern Age_. (shrink)

IN 1792 there appeared anonymously a book entitled, Aenesidemus, or Concerning the Foundations of the Elementary Philosophy Propounded in Jena by Professor Reinhold, including a Defense of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Reason. This curious work, which takes the form of series of letter exchanged between an enthusiastic champion of the new transcendental philosophy and a skeptical critic of this same philosophy, created something of a sensation, appearing as it did at the height of the first (...) wave of general enthusiasm for the Critical Philosophy. Though by no means the first published attack on Kantianism, Aenesidemus was distinguished from most of the other early criticisms by the detailed character of its scrutiny as well as by its willingness to examine the Critical Philosophy not only in its original form, but also in the more "advanced" version represented by K. L. Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy. Aenesidemus claimed to be nothing less than a demonstration of the untenability of the new philosophy, specifically, of its failure to refute what the anonymous author called "Humean skepticism.". (shrink)

Claude Piché | : Il est symptomatique que Fichte ait destiné la première version écrite de sa Doctrine de la science « à ses auditeurs », c’est-à-dire aux étudiants de l’Université d’Iéna où il venait d’entrer en fonction. En effet, Fichte a toujours cru que la lettre de l’exposé proprement scientifique de sa philosophie devait être accompagnée d’une explicitation orale, privilégiant ainsi un contact direct avec l’auditoire en vue d’éviter les malentendus. Tout au long de sa carrière, il s’est en (...) vérité résolument méfié de l’« écrit » et c’est la radicalité de cette attitude qui explique en partie le différend qui s’est fait jour entre lui et Schiller à propos de l’article sur l’« esprit et la lettre en philosophie ». Ces deux termes prennent sous la plume de Fichte une signification inattendue qui témoigne de manière privilégiée de la façon dont il envisage la philosophie transcendantale et son mode de transmission. | : It is striking to notice that Fichte intended the first written version of his Doctrine of Science “for his listeners,” namely for the students of the University of Jena where he had just taken up his post. Fichte in fact always believed that the ‘letter’ of the scientific exposition of his philosophy should be accompanied by an oral explanation, so as to establish a direct contact with his audience in order to avoid misunderstandings. Throughout his career, he was suspicious of the “written” word ; this radical attitude explains at least in part the disagreement that took place between him and Schiller concerning the article “on the spirit and the letter in philosophy.” Under Fichte’s pen, these two terms take on an unexpected meaning that illustrates, in a priviledged way, how he envisages transcendental philosophy and its mode of transmission. (shrink)

RESUMO O presente ensaio aborda o período anterior às obras tidas como as diferentes reescrições da Doutrina da Ciência, de J. G. Fichte, e aí tenta não só perceber a origem da necessidade de um princípio da identidade, como ela surge aquando das primeiras ocorrências do mesmo, mas também discernir os primeiros passos de todo o problema da possibilidade de um princípio absoluto de toda a filosofia, que sempre animaria a empresa. O foco em questão é a «Aenesidemus-Rezension», onde Fichte (...) junta a sua voz ao aceso diálogo já anteriormente entabulado por K. L. Reinhold e G. E. Schulze, e, na necessidade de repensar o princípio da consciência do primeiro, e as críticas a este feitas pelo segundo, é trazido à convicção da necessidade de um novo princípio absoluto; mas onde, e é este o fulcro do presente ensaio, Fichte percebe a insuficiência filososófica do sistema reinholdiano como uma insuficiência de linguagem, e portanto todo o problema como um problema que depende intimamente de uma apoditicidade linguística, e daí parte para a proposta de uma nova terminologia nacional, uma linguagem filosófica sistematicamente certa e inequívoca, à altura de um sistema filosófico regido por um princípio absoluto – um problema que viria a ocupar as cogitações de toda a geração de jovens pensadores em torno do professor de Jena. ABSTRACT This essay approaches the period prior to the works considered as the different versions of the Doctrine of Science, by J. G. Fichte, and aims not only at discerning the origin of the need for a principle of identity, but also at retracing the first steps of the whole problem of the possibility of an absolute principle of all philosophy. The focus shall be the «Aenesidemus-Rezension», where Fichte joins his voice to the heated argument previously struck by K. L. Reinhold and G. E. Schulze, and, urged to rethink Reinhold's principle of consciousness and the criticism raised by Schulze, is brought to believe the necessity for a new absolute principle; but where, and this is the fundamental idea of this essay, Fichte realizes the philosophical insufficiency of Reinhold's system as a language-related insufficiency, and therefore the whole problem as one intimately dependent on a linguistic apodicticity, and moves on to propose a new national terminology, a systematically certain and unequivocal philosophical language, which might meet the demands of a philosophical system ruled by an absolute principle – a problem which would soon be in the agenda of a whole generation of young idealists around the Professor of Jena. (shrink)

RESUMO: Fruto de longa maturação filosófica desde a sua estada em Jena, e instado a isso pelas influências de Karl L. Reinhold e Johann G. Fichte, o poeta Novalis produz, a partir do outono de 1795, um conjunto de anotações fragmentárias sobre a filosofia de Fichte, hoje conhecidas como Fichte-Studien. De entre os importantes temas aí abordados, um revela-se particularmente interessante: o tema do estatuto da Filosofia no seio do problema da autocompreensão do Eu -, e mais concretamente, o (...) necessário pensar da filosofia sobre si própria, as alterações que no processo têm de sobrevir à própria filosofia e a repercussão disto na compreensão de si próprio do Eu. Nesta senda, o seguinte ensaio propõe-se mostrar como, para Novalis, a filosofia é o natural pensar do homem, e como para além disto é a própria filosofia, com o decorrer do seu pensamento sobre si própria, que molda o curso da compreensão de si próprio do Eu: quer tendo com o Eu uma origem comum, nascendo com ele, lançando-o para o mundo e cindindo a união originária em que ele de outro modo sempre estaria, quer, por fim, afirmando-se como carência deste, ou como algo por que o Eu e a própria filosofia têm de passar no seu curso, para que possam experienciar a perda, e almejar à recuperação dessa origem. ABSTRACT: Fruit of a long philosophical maturation that began with his stay in Jena, and encouraged by the influence of Karl L. Reinhold and Johann G. Fichte, the poet Novalis produced, from autumn 1795 on, a set of fragmentary notes on the philosophy of Fichte. These are now known as Fichte-Studien. Among the important issues treated in the notes, one appears particularly interesting: the treatment of the theme of philosophy within the problem of the self-understanding of the "I" - and, more specifically, the need for philosophy to think about itself, about the changes that must come upon philosophy during this process, and about the impact of these on the self-understanding of the "I". The present article aims to show how, for Novalis, philosophy is the natural thought of man. Furthermore, it aims to show how philosophy, in the course of its thought on itself, shapes the course of the self-understanding of the "I", having with the "I" a common origin, being born with it, launching it into the world, cleaving the original union in which it otherwise would always be, and finally asserting itself as a lack of this union, something through which the "I" and philosophy itself must pass in their course so they can experience this loss and aim to recover its source. (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries is one of the most important representatives of the Critical Philosophy, someone who built immediately on the original Kantian philosophy. -/- Fries was born in 1773 in Barby (on the Elbe). In 1805 he was extraordinary professor for philosophy in Jena and in the same year was ordinary professor for philosophy in Heidelberg. Returning to Jena in 1816, one year later he was compulsorily retired because of his participation at the nationalistic and republican Wartburg Festival. (...) In 1924 he obtained a professorship for physics and mathematics, and in 1838 he was given back a professorship for philosophy. He died in 1843 in Jena. -/- The book summarizes the research results of the DFG-Project "Jakob Friedrich Fries' Influence on the Sciences of the 19th Century". The research project was carried out by Dr. Kay Herrmann (Institute of Philosophy, Jena University) and Prof. Dr. Wolfram Hogrebe (Institute of Philosophy, Bonn University). Such a study has special importance. There is available a large amount of literature about the "speculative contemporaries" of Fries, like Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In contrast to the "speculative philosophy", there has been published only a few studies about the Friesian natural philosophy. Fries was, in his natural-philosophical studies, looking for a link between philosophy and modern sciences, wheras his "speculative philosophical" contemporaries felt obligated to stick primarily to a descriptive, phenomenal view of nature. So far the question "How was mathematical natural philosophy regarded by scientists and mathematicians of the 19th century?" has hardly been investigated. Archival studies showed that this gap in Fries-research can be filled. The Friesian correspondence turned out to be a rich gold mine. -/- The present publication is more than a research report. The monographic first part is intended to introduce the foundations of the Friesian theory of cognition, the Friesian methodology, and the Friesian natural philosophy. This should facilitate entry into Friesian philosophy. -/- The Friesian theory is analyzed from two points of view: •How did Fries suceed in continuing and improving the Kantian approach? Is Fries able to remove the weak points of Kantian philosophy? -/- •What is the current significance of the Friesian approach? There are some interesting similarities between the Friesian approach and modern philosophical theories (such like Chomsky's theory of "universal grammer"). The lasting core of the Friesian theory of cognition is: To use empirical studies for working on philosophical problems. -/- Chapters 3 and 4 are scientific-historically oriented. These chapters analyze the Friesian position in scientific and mathematical debates (debates about the a priori foundations of physics, the problem of the identification of physics as an independent discipline, the problem of the boundary between chemistry and physics, the problem of mathematization of the sciences, the theory of the imponderabilia, the systematics and structure of sciences and mathematics, problems of infinity, the differential calculus, the theory of parallel lines) and the relation between Fries and the scientists of the 19th century. The book contains the latest findings gained by evaluation of the Friesian unpublished work (for example the correspondence with W. Weber, C. F. Gauß, E. F. Apelt, O. Schlömilch, Ch. Reichel, B. A. v. Lindenau, L. Gmelin, E. G. Fischer, A. N. Scherer, J. S. C. Schweigger) -/- One result of the research project is that some important scientists took a favourable view of the Friesian theory, but the influence of the Friesian philosophy on the sciences of the 19th century was very limited. The causes are very complex: An anti-natural-philosophical spirit of age, the limits of the Kantian inspired philosophy and some unfavourable aspects in the biography of Fries. -/- For the first time the voluminous Fries-Reichel-correspondence was evaluated. The Fries-Reichel-correspondence contains the Friesian approach to prove the 11th Euclidean axiom, and the whole transcript of the Friesian attempt at proof is given. // Der erste Teil des Buches will in die Grundprobleme Fries’scher Erkenntnis­theorie, Methodenlehre und Naturphilosophie einführen, wobei das Hauptaugenmerk auf die Fortführung der kantischen Ansätze durch Fries sowie auf die aktuelle Interpretation der Fries’schen Lehre gerichtet ist. Der wissenschaftshistorisch ausgerichtete zweite Teil analysiert Fries’ Stellung zu naturwissenschaftlichen und mathematischen Diskussionsrichtungen (Probleme der Identifizierung der Physik als eigenständige Disziplin, der Grenzziehung zwischen Physik und Chemie, der Mathematisierung der Naturwissenschaften, der Imponderabilientheorie, der Systematik von Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik, des Unendlichen, der Parallelentheorie usw.) sowie sein Verhältnis zu Naturwissenschaftlern und Mathematikern seiner Zeit. Das Buch enthält neue Erkenntnisse, die aus der Auswertung zahlreicher Nachlassmaterialien gewonnen wurden. Erstmalig wird unter dem Blickwinkel „Fries als Naturwissenschaftler und Mathematiker“ auch der sehr umfangreiche Reichel-Briefwechsel ausgewertet. Dem Reichel-Briefwechsel entstammt auch Fries’ Versuch eines Beweises des Parallelenaxioms, der in diesem Buch erstmalig in transkribierter Form vollständig vorliegt. -/- . (shrink)

Conceptions of autonomy in western philosophy and ethics have often centred on self-governance and self-determination. However, a growing bulk of literature also questions such conceptions, including the understanding of the autonomous self as a self-governing independent individual that chooses, acts, and lives in accordance with her or his own values, norms, or sense of self. This article contributes to the critical interrogation of selfhood, autonomy, and autonomous decision making by combining a feminist focus on relational dimensions of selfhood and autonomy (...) with phenomenological philosophy of the embodied self as being-in-the-world. It offers a philosophical investigation of different dimensions of bodily relational autonomy by turning to phenomenological accounts of the lived body as self-reflexive. When so doing, we hope to contribute to bridging the gap that sometimes exists between discussions of autonomy in analytic moral philosophy and of freedom and facticity in phenomenological philosophy. We see this gap as unfortunate, and hold that a nuanced understanding of autonomy and autonomous decision making can be reached if these strands of philosophy are brought into dialogue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minor Socratics* PHILIP MERLAN OF MEN MORE OR LESS DECISIVELY influenced by Socrates, three--Antisthenes (c. 455-360), Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435-356), and Eucleides of Megara (c. 450380 )--became founders of schools (or sects) often referred to as "minor Socratic schools." These schools are the Cynic, the Cyrenaic, and the Megaric, respectively. The names of the last two are self-explanatory. That of the first sounds somewhat like "dog (kytn)-like." By (...) some it is assumed to have been derived from the meeting place of Antisthenes with his followers, the gymnasium of Kynosarges; x others believe it to be contemptuously indicative of the dog-like life of the members of the sect (shamelessness, begging, barking, biting). 2 In this sense it was proudly and defiantly accepted by the members themselves, a What we know of the ethical teachings of the Megaric school amounts to hardly more than one sentence, in which the Good seems to have been identified with the One. 4 All we can say of this formula is that it, in some way, links the * Size (very limited), scope (ethical doctrines only), manner of presentation (for the general reader and rather dogmatic), etc., of this article were determined by the character of the Encyclopedia of Morals, in which it originally appeared. The present footnotes try to make up for some of the shortcomings unavoidable in this kind of article. [The Journal is grateful to Philosophical Library, Inc. for permission to reprint this article. The footnotes were subsequently added by Professor Merlan and appear here for the first time.] As the only collection of fragments of Cynics (Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates, Monimus, Demonax, Oenomaus, Teles, Bion) is that contained in F. W. A. Mullach, Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum (Paris: 1865), vol. II, pp. 274-429, which is hard to obtain (the collection of fragments by A. W. Winekelmann, Antisthenis fragmenta [1842] even harder), I shall quote them directly from the sources. There was no need to do so with the Cyrenaics, as we have two recent collections of their fragments: G. Giannantoni, 1 Cirenaici (Florence, n.d.: [1958])--they will be quoted as G--and E. Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta (K~51n-Leiden: 1961), which will be quoted as Ma. A generous selection of fragments of Megarians, Cynics and Cyrenaics in German translation with introduction and notes is contained in W. Nestle, Die Sokratiker (Jena: 1922), pp. 79-177. Our knowledge of Antisthenes would considerably be enriched if we could follow H. Kesters, who, in a number of publications (one of them: Plaidoyer d'un Socratique... [Louvain: 1959]) ascribes Themistius, Or. XXVI to Antisthenes. However, the ascription is doubtful. i I.e., Whitehound: D.L. VI 13. Elias, In Cat. (CAG XVIII/I, Berlin: 1908), p. Ill, 2-29. Busse has a fourfold explanation of the name, all connected with the word Kt~v. Cf. K. v. Fritz, Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope (Leipzig: 1926), pp. 47-49. D.L. VI 60. 55; Stob. vol. III, p. 462, 16 W.-H. Quotations from Stobaeus refer to: K. Wachsmuth, O. Hense, loannis Stobaei Anthologium, 5 vol. (Berlin: 1884-1902); they are by volume, page, and line of this edition. 4 Eus. PE XIV 17, 1; D.L. II 106 (~v x6 dtTu06v). [143] 144 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Megarians to the Eleatic school 5 but also to some aspects of Plato's Philebus and his Laws, and also to the Epinomis, and, above all, to his lecture or course of lectures "The Good," the conclusion of which was that it is the One which is the Good. 6 And though we know that many Megarians were engaged in political activities,7 we do not know in what way, if any, that highly abstract ethical doctrine was linked to practice. It is entirely different with the other two schools, in which ethical theory is immediately applied to life and theoretical aspects of philosophy are often neglected or even absent. However, there is some doubt as to whether Antisthenes can actually be considered the fountainhead of Cynicism. He seems to have undergone the influence of Socrates late in his life, when he had already been active as a... (shrink)

InhaltVorwort SiglenverzeichnisJakub KLOC-KONKOLOWICZ: »Jeder wird Gott« – Zur Erfüllung des Gesetzes und zumStatus des handelnden Ich Claus DIERKSMEIER: Über die Wirtschaftstheorie in Fichtes Rechtslehre von 1812 Bernhard JAKL: Recht und Zwang in Fichtes Rechtslehre von 1812 Bärbel FRISCHMANN: Fichte über den Rechtsstaat als Sozialstaat Christian STADLER: Dimensionen und Wandlungen des Fichteschen Rechtsbegriffes im Vergleich Jena – Berlin C. Jeffery KINLAW: Law, Morality and Bildung in the 1812 Rechtslehre Claude PICHÉ: L’instauration d’un ordre juridique juste d’après Fichte Gaetano RAMETTA: Das (...) Problem der Souveränität in Fichtes Staatslehre Carla De PASCALE: Fichte und die Verfassung des Vernunftreichs Roberta PICARDI: »Sittliche Natur« und Geschichte beim frühen und späten Fichte Takao SUGITA: Das Nationale in Fichtes Spätwerk Makoto TAKADA: Zur Umwandlung der Staatslehre des späten Fichte Nele SCHNEIDEREIT: Der Diskurs der Moderne in J. G. Fichtes Staatslehre Virginia LÓPEZ-DOMÍNGUEZ: Die Staatslehre von 1813 oder der Kampf der Aufklärung gegen den politischen Irrationalismus der Romantiker zur Verteidigung einer christlich-revolutionären SozialutopieGiovanni COGLIANDRO: »Der Begriff sey Grund der Welt« – Die Sittenlehre 1812 und die letzten Darstellungen der Wissenschaftslehre Max MARCUZZI: La ligne moraleBjörn PECINA: Die affektive Vermittlung. Deutungs- und affekttheoretische Dimensionen der späten Religionsphilosophie FichtesWolfdietrich SCHMIED-KOWARZIK: Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Christentums. Zur Religionsphilosophie im Spätwerk Fichtes Wilhelm G. JACOBS: Der Gottesbegriff in den »Thatsachen des Bewußtseyns« von 1810/11 als Übergang zur Wissenschaftslehre in specie. (shrink)

I have come to believe that the whole framework of our current thought is about to begin a long and radical transformation, based on what I shall call a new science of pure consciousness. The content of most of the matters to be considered by this science have hitherto been the concern of some areas of religion, particularly what in our culture we call ‘mysticism’; but the treatment of it would legitimately be called scientific. Thus one aspect of the transformation (...) would be to overcome that apparent conflict between ‘science’ and ‘religion’, which has been so characteristic of our culture over the last few centuries. (shrink)

The original version of this article unfortunately contained an error. In pages 7 and 8, the reference citation “Lægaard 2016: 13-14” must not be included in the quote.

Inhalt: Klaus HAMMACHER: Nachruf auf Dr. Richard Schottky. Edit DÜSING: Johannes Schurr zum Gedenken. TEIL I. Jürgen STOLZENBERG: Fichtes Satz »Ich bin«. Argumentanalytische Überlegungen zu Paragraph 1 der Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre von 1794/95. Kunihiko NAGASAWA: Intellektuelle Anschauung und Dialektik. Sven JÜRGENSEN: Die Unterscheidung der Realität in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1794. Wilhelm METZ: Fichtes genetische Deduktion von Raum undä Zeit in Differenz zu Kant. Peter ROHS: Über die Zeit als das Mittelglied zwischen dem Intelligiblen und dem Sinnlichen. Daniel BREAZEALE: Philosophy (...) as the Divided Self: On the »Existential« and »Scientific« Tasks of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre. Endre KISS: Zwischen Apriorismus und Empirismus im Kontext der Isomorphie zweier Apriorismen. Zur Rekonstruktion von Fichtes philosophischer Konzeption. TEIL II. Erich HEINTEL: Gewißheit und Wahrheit bei Fichte. H.M. EMRICH: Identität und Versprechen. Hans Georg von MANZ: Selbstgewißheit und Fremdgewißheit. Fichtes Konzeption des Anderen als Konstituens der Selbsterfassung unter Berücksichtigung der Perspektive Lévinas'. Alois K. SOLLER: Die Unbegreiflichkeit der Wechselwirkung der Geister. Das Problem einer »Interpersonalitätslehre« bei Fichte. Carla DE PASCALE: Die Trieblehre bei Fichte. Karen GLOY: Die Naturauffassung bei Kant, Fichte und Schelling. Albert MUES: Der Grund der Dualität der Materie und des Indeterminismus in der physikalischen Natur. Die Lösung eines quantenphysikalischen Rätsels. Marco IVALDO: Zur Geschichtserkenntnis nach der Transzendentalphilosophie. Faustino ONCINA COVES: Geheimnis und Öffentlichkeit bei Fichte. Frank ASCHOFF: Rückkehr zur Metaphysik? Reinholds Abkehr von der Philosophie Fichtes. Ives RADRIZZANI: Der Übergang von der Grundlage zur Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. L. de Vos: Die Realität der Idee. TEIL III. Wilhelm LÜTTERFELDS: Fichtes Konzept absoluter Einheit - ein performativer Selbstwiderspruch? Urs RICHLI: »Ich aber fordere Sie auf, absolute Genesis ins Auge zu fassen!« Realität und absolute Negativität in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 und in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Hartmut TRAUB: Realität und System. Das Realitätsproblem in Fichtes Theorie der Fünffachheit. (shrink)

Si la danse est peu présente dans l’œuvre esthétique d’Étienne Souriau, celui-ci a entretenu des liens étroits avec certains penseurs de la danse de son temps. En 1965, il écrit deux préfaces consacrées à la danse, et la danse occupe une place importante dans le Vocabulaire d’esthétique qu’il dirige. Ces textes demandent à être replacés dans leur contexte institutionnel et théorique, ce qui nécessite de remonter jusqu’aux années 1920-1930. Plus largement se pose la question des relations entre la philosophie esthétique (...) et la danse (notamment la danse classique). (shrink)

The main subject of this very original and engaging book is the history of the idea of formal proof. Von Plato shows how that idea emerged, from the Greeks to the crucial last few decades of the ni...

Professor Oswald Szemerényi's Einführung in die vergleichende Sprachwissenschaft, first published in 1970, remains the standard introduction to comparative Indo-European linguistics. It is available here in English for the first time, in a revised, enlarged, and updated fifth edition. The introductory section presents a general survey of the principles of diachronic-comparative linguistics, and the remainder of the book is a thorough and detailed analysis, according to those principles, of the phonological and morphological structure of the Indo-European group of languages. Each section (...) of the book has a detailed bibliography, so that the student can progress from the general overview to a more detailed examination of particular topics. (shrink)

‘Biochromatology’ can be defined as the study of the relationships between colours, and between colours and design in nature. Certain laws concerning biochromatics can be formulated in the terminology of the Colour Circle. One of them is that planes in warm colours and planes in cold colours never adjoin. Another law is that design is never polychromatic. It seems that the observed biochromatical facts can be explained with the help of the principle “optimal manifestation of colour”, which in turn is (...) based on the formative principles of matter itself. (shrink)

Solving complex spiritual problems of modern life leads us to rethinking its higher meanings, absolute values, essences. Philosophical and cultural worldview, as the supreme form of knowledge and comprehension of the existence of the world and man, now directs the study of the root causes, the essential foundations of the world order, the disclosure of the deep meaning of what is happening to the world, society, culture and man, focuses on the creation of universal explanatory models of things, its individual (...) components. Philosophical and cultural reflection as analytical means of cognition involves the ability to go beyond the real spheres of being and deduces the general cultural categories of the world of thought, such as being and non-being, God and soul, time and eternity, spirit and matter, death and immortality, etc. It is in the sense of reflexive activity of philosophical and cultural consciousness that it is possible to consider any phenomenon of being not in itself, but through the prism of the space of deep cultural meanings, which testifies to the metaphysical nature of culture, which is connected with the world of higher, absolute meanings and entities. In cultural studies, there is a tremendous experience with genesis and historical development of socio-cultural life, in particular, religious and philosophical culture. (shrink)